University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Engineering and Information
Sciences - Papers: Part A

Faculty of Engineering and Information
Sciences

1-1-2013

On RFID authentication protocols with wide-strong privacy
Nan Li
University of Wollongong, nl864@uowmail.edu.au

Yi Mu
University of Wollongong, ymu@uow.edu.au

Willy Susilo
University of Wollongong, wsusilo@uow.edu.au

Fuchun Guo
University of Wollongong, fuchun@uow.edu.au

Vijay Varadharajan
Macquarie University

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers
Part of the Engineering Commons, and the Science and Technology Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Li, Nan; Mu, Yi; Susilo, Willy; Guo, Fuchun; and Varadharajan, Vijay, "On RFID authentication protocols with
wide-strong privacy" (2013). Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences - Papers: Part A. 1817.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/1817

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

On RFID authentication protocols with wide-strong privacy
Abstract
Radio frequency identification (RFID) tag privacy is an important issue to RFID security. To date, there
have been several attempts to achieve the wide-strong privacy by using zero-knowledge protocols. In this
paper, we launch an attack on the recent zero-knowledge based identification protocol for RFID, which
was claimed to capture wide-strong privacy, and show that this protocol is flawed. Subsequently, we
propose two zero-knowledge based tag authentication protocols and prove that they offer wide-strong
privacy.

Disciplines
Engineering | Science and Technology Studies

Publication Details
Li, N., Mu, Y., Susilo, W., Guo, F. & Varadharajan, V. (2013). On RFID authentication protocols with widestrong privacy. Cryptology and Information Security Series, 11 3-16.

This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/1817

On RFID Authentication Protocols with
Wide-Strong Privacy 1
Nan Li a , Yi Mu a , Willy Susilo a,2 , Fuchun Guo a and Vijay Varadharajan b
a
Centre for Computer and Information Security Research, School of Computer
Science and Software Engineering, University of Wollongong, Wollongong,
Australia
e-mail: {nl864,ymu,wsusilo,fuchun}@uow.edu.au
b
Information and Networked Systems Security Research, Department of
Computing, Faculty of Science, Macquarie University, Sydney,Australia
e-mail: vijay.varadharajan@mq.edu.au
Abstract. Radio frequency identification (RFID) tag privacy is an important issue to RFID security. To date, there have been several attempts to achieve the wide-strong privacy by using zero-knowledge protocols. In this paper, we launch an attack on the recent zero-knowledge
based identification protocol for RFID, which was claimed to capture
wide-strong privacy, and show that this protocol is flawed. Subsequently,
we propose two zero-knowledge based tag authentication protocols and
prove that they offer wide-strong privacy.

1. Introduction
Radio frequency identification (RFID) tags have very limited computation and
storage resources and are usually not tamper-resistant. For example, an attacker
could physically access the RFID tag and collect its internal state. The RFID tag
communicates with the RFID reader via a wireless interaction, and hence, there
is a security concern. The attacker could be able to identify a tag by using the
information collected from tag-reader communication. Therefore, the privacy of
RFID tags has become an issue in RFID applications.
Vaudenay [22] introduced the strong privacy model which captures a number
of RFID privacy cases, which are corresponding to eight classes with respect to
eight different privacy levels from weak to strong. The strongest level is the widestrong privacy. Later, Ng, Susilo, Mu and Safavi-Naini [16] refined the Vaudenay’s
model and claimed that the wide-strong privacy is possible. Based on the BohliPashalidis’ model [2,3] and Vaudenay’s model, Hermans, Pashalidis, Vercautern
and Preneel [10] proposed a new practical RFID privacy model which relies on
the indistinguishability of tags.
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Wide-strong privacy is achievable by using the public key cryptography
(PKC) [22,16]. An RFID authentication protocol based on the IND-CCA2 secure
public key encryption scheme is strong private for wide adversaries [10]. Deursen
and Radomirović [7] proposed the wide-strong private authentication protocol by
employing the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme.
The digital signature is an alternative cryptographic primitive in PKC. However, a traditional digital signature is hard to preserve the tag’s privacy as the signature is publicly verifiable. Fortunately, we found that digital signatures, such as
strong designated verifier signatures [11], can be obtained by applying IND-CCA2
encryption schemes. Thus, it is possible to construct a wide-strong private identification protocol based on strong designated verifier signature schemes. The elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC) based RFID authentication protocols are acceptable
by low-cost RFID tags [9,15]. Many ECC based RFID authentication protocols
[21,12,13,14,1] were proposed. Most of them are the variants of the Schnorr signature scheme. However, these schemes have been unfortunately broken later in
[8,12,5,6,4]. Recently, a new and interesting protocol was proposed by Peeters and
Hermans [18]. They claimed that the protocol achieves the wide-strong privacy.
Our Contributions
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, in contrast to the claim made in
[18]3 , we demonstrate that Peeters and Hermans’ [18] protocol is vulnerable to our
attack, which makes the tag traceable. Second, we propose two wide-strong private
protocols based on zero-knowledge. The proposed protocols offer provable widestrong privacy in the model described in [10]. As features of our protocols, the
reader can convince a third party, such as a client in the supply chain, the presence
of the tag by signature which is extracted from a successful authentication and
our (second) optimized protocol eliminates the modular operations in the prime
field.
Paper Organizations
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe some
mathematical preliminaries and review the underlying privacy model. Section 3
demonstrates an attack launched by the wide-strong adversary against Peeters
and Hermans’ protocol. We proposed a basic protocol and prove the privacy
in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively. An optimized protocol is presented in
Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.

2. Preliminaries
In this section, we give the definitions of some mathematical preliminaries and
present the adopted privacy model of this paper.
3 The authors updated their paper [18] in eprint and the new version does not suffer from the
attack.

2.1. Bilinear Maps
Let G1 , G2 and GT be three additive cyclic groups of same prime order q. P and
V are generators of group G1 and G2 , respectively. The map e : G1 × G2 → GT
is a bilinear mapping (pairing) and (P, V, q, e, G1 , G2 , GT ) is a bilinear group.
Let ψ be a computable isomorphism from G2 to G1 that ψ(V ) = P . We say it
is a symmetric bilinear group if G1 = G2 = G. A bilinear pairing satisfies the
properties as follows:
• Bilinearity: for all P ∈ G1 , V ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Z∗q , we have the equation
e(P a , V b ) = e(P, V )ab .
• Non-Degeneracy: for all P ∈ G1 , V ∈ G2 , if P, V are generators respectively, we have e(P, V ) 6= 1 is a generator of GT .
• Efficiency: There is an efficient algorithm to calculate e(P, V ) for all P ∈
G1 , V ∈ G2 .
2.2. Complexity Assumptions
Definition 1 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption) Given a tuple
< P, aP, bP >, where a, b ∈R Z∗q , P is a generator of the group G, there is no
PPT adversary can find abP with advantage at least .
2.3. Privacy Model
In this paper, we use the privacy model defined in [10]. The oracles defined in the
model are as follows.
• CreateTag(ID) → Ti : Taking as input a tag’s identifier ID, the oracle sets
up and registers a new tag to server. Then, it outputs the reference Ti of
the tag.
• Launch() → π, m: It launches a new session π and returns the first message
m sent by the reader.
• DrawTag(Ti , Tj ) → vtag: Taking as input a pair of tag references (Ti , Tj ),
it outputs vtag which is a virtual tag reference linked to either Ti or Tj
according to the value of g, where g ∈ {0, 1}. The oracle outputs ⊥, if Ti
or Tj is already drawn.
• Free(vtag): Taking as input a virtual tag vtag, it retrieves the tuple
(vtag, Ti , Tj ) and moves (Ti , Tj ) to the set of free tags and resets Ti ’s (if
g = 0) or Tj ’s (if g = 1) volatile memory.
• SendTag(vtag, m) → m0 : Taking as input a virtual tag vtag and a message
m, the oracle retrieves (vtag, Ti , Tj ) and sends m to the tag Ti (if g = 0)
or Tj (if g = 1). It outputs the tag’s response m0 .
• SendReader(π, m) → m0 : Taking as input an instance π and a message m,
the oracle sends m to the reader in session π and outputs the reader’s
response m0 . If the session π is not activated, the oracle outputs ⊥.
• Result(π) → c: Taking as input an instance π, the oracle outputs the result
c of the authentication if π exists, otherwise outputs ⊥.
• Corrupt(Ti ) → s: Taking as input a reference Ti of the tag, the oracle
outputs the state s of the tag if Ti is not drawn, otherwise outputs ⊥.

The model defined eight different classes of privacy and adversary. In each
class, the adversary is restricted by the capability of oracle access. The strongest
adversary in the model is the wide-strong adversary who can access the all above
oracles as many times as he needs in polynomial time. The privacy experiment
Expws−private
for the wide-strong adversary is as follows:
A,S
1. Setup: The system S sets up the system depending on the security parameter k and chooses a random bit g ∈ {0, 1}.
2. Learning: The adversary A can interact with S in polynomial time and
queries all above oracles.
3. Guess: The adversary outputs a bit g 0 . If g 0 = g, the experiment outputs
1, 0 otherwise.
We say that the adversary A wins the wide-strong privacy game if and only
if the experiment outputs 1.
Definition 2 A RFID authentication protocol is privacy-preserving if there is no
adversary A who wins the wide-strong privacy game in polynomial time t with the
advantage AdvA at least , where

= 1] −
AdvA = Pr[Expws−privacy
A,S

1
≥ .
2

3. A Simple Attack

In RFID privacy models [22,10], the adversary is classified to “narrow” and “wide”
according to whether allowed to query Result oracle during the simulation. A wide
adversary can query the Result oracle to check whether a session is valid. Our
attack exploits the capabilities of wide-strong adversaries where they can forge
new sessions by using the tag’s private key and verify the validity of the forgery.
In the attack, the adversary can query all oracles defined in Section 2.3. He
chooses two tags T0 and T1 and queries the Corrupt oracle to both of them. Upon
receiving the internal state of T0 and T1 , the adversary issues SendTag query to a
virtual tag Tg which is either linked to T0 or T1 . The adversary generates a new
response I ∗0 by using the tag’s state and I ∗ which is the response of the tag.
Then, the adversary submits I ∗0 to the Result oracle. Based on the output of the
Result oracle, the adversary can output a correct link between the virtual tag and
the target tag. The attack is depicted as in Fig.1.

V irtual T ag

Adversary

Challenger
Corrupt(T0 ),Corrupt(T1 )

−−−−−−−−−−−→

state(T0 ),state(T1 )

←−−−−−−−−−−−

SendTag

←−−−−−−−−−−−
Tg ∈R {T0 , T1 }

I∗

−−−−−−−−−−−→
Generate I ∗0
Result(I ∗0 )

−−−−−−−−−−−→
Accept or Reject

←−−−−−−−−−−−

Guess Tg = T0 or T1

Figure 1. Our attack.

3.1. Peeters and Hermans’ Protocol
Recently, Peeters and Hermans [18] proposed an interesting RFID identification
protocol based on zero-knowledge. They presented two protocols where the second
one is an efficient optimized version. Here, we review their improved protocol. In
the protocol, both tag and reader have a pair of public/private keys (x, X = xP )
and (y, Y = yP ), respectively. The public keys X and Y are mutually known to
the reader and the tag. The protocol initiated with the tag generating a random
number r ∈ Z∗q . The tag sends the reader R = rP and receives the reader’s
response e, where e ∈ Z∗q . The tag computes
d = xcoord(rY ), s = x + er + d,
where xcoord is a function which returns the value of x-coordinate of the input
point, and sends s to the reader. Upon receiving the response, the reader computes
d0 = xcoord(yR), X 0 = (s − d0 )P − eR,
and accepts the tag if X 0 appears in the database. The protocol is depicted as in
Fig. 2.
The authors claimed that their protocol is wide-strong private, while we show
that the protocol is vulnerable to our attack.
Theorem 1 In Peeters and Hermans’ protocol (Figure 2), a wide-strong adversary
is able to break the tag’s private with advantage Pr[Ē] = 1 − nq .
Proof 1 Suppose that the public system parameters (P, Y ), where P is a generator
of a goup G and Y is the reader’s public key, are known to the adversary. Given
an instance of the protocol execution of the tag T0 or the tag T1 , the wide-strong
adversary A aims to decide which tag involves the session.
The adversary A issues two oracle calls, which are Corrupt(T0 ) and Corrupt(T1 )
to the challenger. The challenger respectively returns T0 and T1 ’s private keys x0

Reader(y, DB{Xi })

T ag(x, Y )
r ∈ Z∗q , R = rP
R

←−−−−−−−−−
e ∈ Z∗q

e

−−−−−−−−−→
d = xcoord(rY )
s = x + er + d
s

←−−−−−−−−−
0

d = xcoord(yR)
X 0 = (s − d0 )P − eR ∈ DB?
Figure 2. Peeters and Hermans’ protocol.

and x1 to the adversary. In the challenge phase, the challenger gives an instance
I ∗ of the protocol execution, where I ∗ = (R∗ , e∗ , s∗ ). The instance is generated
by using the tag T ∗ ’s private key x∗ , where x∗ = x0 or x∗ = x1 . Hence, we have
s∗ = x∗ + e∗ r∗ + d∗ ,
where d∗ = xcoord(r∗ Y ). Then, A generates a new instance I ∗0 = (R∗0 , e∗0 , s∗0 )
as follows,
R∗0 = R∗ , e∗0 = e∗ , s∗0 = s∗ − x0 + x1 .
Since A is a wide adversary, it queries the Result oracle on input a session I ∗0 .
The challenger then returns whether it accepts the session. If the challenger’s
output is 1, it means that I ∗0 is valid and A has
s∗0 = s∗ − x0 + x1 = (x∗ − x0 + x1 ) + e∗ r∗ + d∗ .
Then, we have three cases:
• Case 1 (x∗ − x0 + x1 = x0 ): With the new session wrt tag T0 , A has the
solution that x∗ = 2x0 − x1 .
• Case 2 (x∗ − x0 + x1 = x1 ): With the new session wrt tag T1 , A has the
solution that x∗ = x0 .
• Case 3 (x∗ − x0 + x1 = x2 ): With the new session wrt another tag T2 , where
x2 is the private key of T2 , A has the solution x∗ = x2 + x0 − x1 .
According to the knowledge that x∗ is either x0 or x1 and assuming tags have
individual keys, Case 1 is impossible as it indicates x0 = x1 . A can deduce from
Case 2 and Case 3 that
x∗ = x0 or x∗ = x2 + x0 − x1 = x1 .

Then, A can guess the session I ∗ is related to the tag T0 with a high probability.
If the challenger rejects the session I ∗0 , A can decide I ∗ is related to the tag T1 .
Therefore, the protocol is vulnerable to our attack.
Let E be the event that there exists the tag T2 with the private key
x2 = 2x1 − x0 .
Since a tag’s private key is randomly chosen from Z∗q , it can be considered that
2x1 − x0 is also a random value. Event E occurs with a negligible probability nq ,
where n is the number of tags except T0 and T1 . Hence, the adversary outputs a
correct guess with the probability
Pr[Ē] = 1 −

n
.
q
2

4. Proposed Protocol
Many ECC-based RFID identification protocols employ Diffie-Hellman keys to
preserve the privacy of the tag. Usually, there are two approaches to generate the
Diffie-Hellman key: 1) The tag uses its private key and the nonce(s) to compute
with the reader’s public key (e.g., [1,12,13]); 2) The tag chooses a random number
to compute with the reader’s public key (e.g., [18]). However, a strong adversary
can compromise the tag and obtain the tag’s private key. Hence, the two ways
provide the equal level of privacy protection under the strong attack. In this
paper, we adopt the second approach.
To withstand the attack described in Section 3, the tag’s response should
not be transferable to another valid response even if the tag’s private key is
known to the adversary. In our protocol, we protect the tag’s private key by using
two random values. Given a valid tag’s response, anyone who does not have the
tag’s temporary key or the reader’s private key cannot output a new valid tag’s
response.
Our protocol is a variant of the Schnorr identification protocol [19]. The
identification process consists of two passes where the reader initiates the session.
Prior to identifying the tag, both of the reader and the tag are required to store
particular states. Let G is an additive group with the prime order p and P is a
generator of the group. The public/private key pairs of the tag and the reader
are (x, X = xP ) and (y, Y = yP ), respectively, where x, y ∈R Z∗q . Initially, the
backend server inserts the tag’s public key X into the database DB as the tag’s
identifier. The server sets the tuple (x, Y, P ) as the tag’s state and stores it into
the tag. The reader receives its pair of public/private keys and it is allowed to
access the database.
To identify a tag, the reader randomly chooses C ∈ G and sends C as a
challenge to the tag. Upon receiving the challenge, the tag firstly picks a random
number r ∈ Z∗q and computes R = rP . Let h : G×G×G → Z∗q be a cryptographic
hash function. The tag generates a signing message

v = h(R, rY, C),
where rY is a temporary Diffie-Hellman key. The signing message is computable
if and only if either the tag’s choice r or the reader’s private key y is known. It is
significant to preserve the tag’s privacy. Then the tag computes
s = xv + r

(mod q),

and sends (R, s) to the reader. On receiving the tag’s response, the reader extracts
the tag’s identity as
v 0 = h(R, yR, C), X 0 = (sP − R)v 0

−1

.

If X 0 exists in the database, the tag is identified, otherwise it is rejected. The
proposed basic RFID identification protocol is depicted as in Fig. 3.

Reader(y, X)

T ag(x, Y )

Choose c ∈R Z∗q , C = cP
C

−−−−−−−−−−→
r ∈R Z∗q , R = rP
v = h(R, rY, C)
s = xv + r (mod q)
R,s

←−−−−−−−−−−
0

Compute v = h(R, yR, C)
−1
X 0 = (sP − R)v 0
0
check if X is in the database
Figure 3. Baisc protocol.

The reader can extract the tag’s signature after a successful tag authentication. Given yR and C, anyone who has the tag’s public key X can verify the validity of the signature (R, s). It is an important difference between the encryption
based protocols and the zero-knowledge based protocols.

5. Privacy Analysis
We analyse the privacy of the proposed basic protocol and show that it is widestrong private under the model [10].
Theorem 2 The proposed basic RFID authentication protocol is private against
the wide-strong attack if the CDH problem is hard.
Proof 2 Suppose that there is an adversary A who can (, qh , t)-distinguish the
‘left’ and ‘right’ world in the wide-strong privacy experiment. Let A has an advantage 0 to solve the CDH problem. We can construct an algorithm B run by

the challenger to solve the CDH problem using the adversary A. Given the CDH
instance (P, aP, bP ), algorithm B aims to output abP . On behalf of the system S,
B interacts with the adversary A as follows.
• Setup: B sets P as the generator of the additive cyclic group G. Let the
public key of the reader be Y = aP and the private key of the reader be
y = a, which is unknown to B. B maintains the lists Lh = {< R, rY, C, v >
}, LRef = {< vtag, Ti , Tj >}, LS = {< T, π, z >} and a database of tags
T = {< ID, T, X, x >}, which are initially empty. B tosses a coin and sets
g = 0 or g = 1, where Pr[g = 0] = Pr[g = 1] = 12 . The virtual tag reference
vtag is an incremental counter starts from 0.
• h Query: A issues hE query on input (Ri , ri Y, Ci ) at most qh times. B
outputs vi if (Ri , ri Y, Ci ) is in the list Lh . Otherwise, B randomly selects vi ∈ Z∗q and sets h(Ri , ri Y, Ci ) = vi . Then, B outputs vi and adds
< Ri , ri Y, Ci , vi > into the list Lh .
• CreateTag Query: A issues the oracle query on input a tag identity IDi . If
IDi is not in T , B sets up a new tag Ti and generates the tag’s pubic/private
key pair (xi , Xi ), where xi ∈ Z∗q , Xi = xi P . B outputs the reference Ti and
adds < IDi , Ti , Xi , xi > into the database T . If IDi exists, B ignores the
query.
• DrawTag Query: A issues the oracle query on input a pair of tag references
(Ti , Tj ). If any of the issued tags is not free, which is currently referenced,
the oracle outputs ⊥. If g = 0, B references vtag to Ti , Tj otherwise. B
outputs vtag and adds < vtag, Ti , Tj > into the list LRef .
• Free Query: A issues the oracle query on input a reference vtag. If vtag is
in the list LRef , B deletes the entry < vtag, Ti , Tj > and erases the volatile
memory of the referenced tag, which is Ti or Tj .
• Corrupt Query: A issues the oracle query on input a tag reference Ti . If Ti
is not in T , B firstly creates a new tag by using CreateTag Query. B then
outputs the tag’s secret key xi .
• SendTag Query: A issues the oracle query on input vtag and a message Ci .
If the entry < vtag, Ti , Tj > is not in the list LRef , B outputs ⊥. Otherwise, B retrieves the the referenced tag Tg ’s secret key xg and computes as
follows.
∗ Randomly selects zi ∈ Z∗q and let ri = b + zi . Then, B computes Ri =
bP + zi P .
∗ B randomly picks wi ∈ Z∗q and lets vi = wi − xbg .
∗ Computes si = xg wi + zi and sets mi = (Ri , si ), πi = (Ci , mi ).
B outputs mi and adds < Ti , πi , zi > into the list LS . We show that the
simulation is perfect as
si = xg wi + zi
= xg (wi −
= xg vi + ri

b
) + (b + zi )
xg

• SendReader Query: Since there is no reply message from the reader, B ignores the query to this oracle.
• Result Query: A issues the oracle query on input a session πi . B responses
as follows.
∗ If πi is in the list LS , B accepts the session and outputs 1.
∗ If πi ,is not in the list LS , B looks up the list Lh . If < Ri , ·, Ci , vi > is
not in Lh , B outputs 0 and rejects the session.
∗ B Computes Xi = (si P − Ri )vi−1 and verifies it by checking if Xi in the
the database T . B outputs 1 if it exists, 0 otherwise.
Eventually, the adversary has to output a bit g 0 ∈ {0, 1} in the guess phase.
That is, to determine which world (‘left’ or ‘right’) the simulation has encountered. If the adversary successfully outputs g 0 = g, he wins the experiment and
B can use it to solve the CDH problem. Since A has to query the hash oracle
to determine which tag is referenced during the experiment, there is at least one
query input (Ri , ri Y, ci ) to the Hash Query is correct. B retrieves ri Y from the list
Lh and computes abP = ri Y − zi Y , where zi ∈ LS , to be a solution of the given
CDH problem.
The simulation fails when B rejects a valid session. It occurs when A issued
a valid session π to Result while < Ri , ·, Ci , vi > is not in the list Lh . A valid
session which is not generated by B implies that the adversary could find the DiffieHellman key ri Y or guess the correct si . Let the event E be that the simulation
fails. We have the negligible probability Pr[E] ≤  + nq , where n is the number of
tags in T .
2
6. Optimisation
RFID tags are resource-constrained devices which have limited gates to implement protocols. The increase of the tag’s gates costs more in production. In terms
of the hardware implementation of our basic protocol, the tag is required to do
the modular in both of the prime field and the binary field. Although the modular
is an efficient operation, it consumes large number of gates for the hardware implementation [17,20]. Unfortunately, most of RFID identification protocols which
are based on public key cryptography need modular calculations in both of the
prime field and the binary field.
In this section, we propose an optimized protocol and show that the number
of required gates are reduced. As a feature, there is no modular operation in the
prime filed required to the tag. Instead, only the modular in the binary field is
needed.
6.1. Protocol 2
The optimized protocol also consists of two passes where the reader initiates the
session. Let G be an additive group with the prime order q and e be a bilinear
pairing, where e : G × G → GT . P1 and P2 are two generators of the group G.

The public/private key pairs of the tag and the reader are (xP2 , X = e(P1 , xP2 ))
and (y, Y = yP2 ), respectively, where x, y ∈R Z∗q . The backend server inserts the
entry of the tag into the databse and stores the tuple (xP2 , Y, P1 , P2 ) into the tag.
The reader receives its pair of public/private keys and it is allowed to access the
database.
To identify a tag, the reader randomly selects C ∈ G and sends C as a
challenge to the tag. Upon receiving the challenge, the tag chooses a random
number r ∈ Z∗q and computes R = rP1 . Then, the tag generate a signing message
v as in the basic protocol, where v = h(R, rY, C). The tag computes
S = vxP2 + rP2 ,
and sends (R, S) to the reader. On receiving the tag’s response, the reader extracts
the tag’s identity as
0

0



v = h(R, yR, C), X =

e(P1 , S)
e(R, P2 )

v0 −1
.

If X 0 exists in the database, the tag is identified, otherwise it is rejected. The
optimized RFID identification protocol is depicted as in Fig.4.

Reader(X = e(P1 , xP2 ), y, Y = yP2 )

T ag(xP2 , Y )

Choose c ∈R Z∗q , C = cP2
C

−−−−−−−−−−→
r ∈R Z∗q , R = rP1
v = h(R, rY, C)
S = vxP2 + rP2
R,S

←−−−−−−−−−−
0

Compute v = h(R, yR, C)

v0 −1
e(P1 ,S)
X 0 = e(R,P
)
2
check if X 0 is in the database

Figure 4. Optimized protocol.

6.2. Privacy Analysis
Theorem 3 The proposed optimized RFID identification protocol is private against
the wide-strong adversary if the CDH problem is hard.
Proof 3 Suppose that there is an adversary A who can (, qh , t)-distinguish the
‘left’ and ‘right’ world in the wide-strong privacy experiment. Let A has an advantage 0 to solve the CDH problem. Given an instance (P, aP, bP ), we can construct
an algorithm B to find the solution abP of CDH problem using the adversary A.
B interacts with the adversary A as follows.

• Setup: B selects k, where k ∈ Z∗q and sets P1 , P2 , where P1 = kP, P2 =
P , as two generators of the additive cyclic group G. Let the public key
of the reader be Y = aP and the private key of the reader be y = a,
which is unknown to B. B maintains the lists Lh = {< R, rY, C, v >},
LRef = {< vtag, Ti , Tj >}, LS = {< T, π, z >} and a database of tags
T = {< ID, T, X, xP >}, which are initially empty. B tosses a coin and
sets g = 0 or g = 1, where Pr[g = 0] = Pr[g = 1] = 21 . The virtual tag
reference vtag is an incremental counter starts from 0.
• h Query: A issues hE query on input (Ri , ri Y, Ci ) at most qh times. B
outputs vi if (Ri , ri Y, Ci ) is in the list Lh . Otherwise, B picks vi ∈ Z∗q and
sets h(Ri , ri Y, Ci ) = vi . Then, B outputs vi and adds < Ri , ri Y, Ci , vi >
into the list Lh .
• CreateTag Query: A issues the oracle query on input a tag’s identity IDi . B
ignores the query if IDi exists. Otherwise, B randomly chooses xi ∈ Z∗q and
computes Xi = e(kP, xi P ). Then, B creates a new tag and sets (Xi , xi P )
as its public and private key pair. B outputs the reference Ti and adds
< IDi , Ti , Xi , xi P > into the database T .
• DrawTag Query: A issues the oracle query on input a pair of tag references
(Ti , Tj ). If any of the issued tags is not free, the oracle outputs ⊥. Depending
on the value of g, B references vtag to Ti (if g = 0) or Tj (if g = 1). B
outputs vtag and adds < vtag, Ti , Tj > into the list LRef .
• Free Query: A issues the oracle query on input a reference vtag. If vtag
is in the list LRef , B removes the entry < vtag, Ti , Tj > and erases the
volatile memory of the referenced tag.
• Corrupt Query: A issues the oracle query on input a tag reference Ti . If
Ti is not in T , B creates a new tag by running CreateTag Query. B then
outputs the tag’s secret key xi P .
• SendTag Query: A issues the oracle query on input vtag and a message
Ci . B outputs ⊥ If < vtag, Ti , Tj > is not in the list LRef . Otherwise, B
retrieves the the referenced tag Tg ’s secret key xg P and randomly selects
zi , wi ∈ Z∗q . Then, B computes
Ri = kbP + zi kP, Si = wi xg P + zi P,
and sets mi = (Ri , Si ), πi = (Ci , mi ). B outputs mi and adds < Ti , πi , zi >
into the list LS .
• SendReader Query: Since there is no reply message from the reader, B ignores the query to this oracle.
• Result Query: A issues the oracle query on input a session πi . B outputs 1
if πi is in the list LS , otherwise B outputs 0 if < Ri , ·, Ci , vi > is not in
e(P1 ,Si ) v −1
the list Lh . If < Ri , ·, Ci , vi > exists, B computes Xi = ( e(R
) i and
i ,P2 )
outputs 1 if Xi appears in T , 0 otherwise.
Eventually, if the adversary outputs a guess g 0 , where g 0 = g, B has at least
one correct value of ri Y in the list Lh . B can find the solution of CDH problem
as abP = ri Y − zi Y , where zi ∈ LS . The simulation fails when B outputs a false
rejection with the negligible probability at most  + nq , where n is the number of
tags in T .
2

7. Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrated an attack which is launched by the wide-strong
adversary on the Peeters and Hermans’ identification protocol. Given a valid
session, the adversary can make a new session and distinguish the tag based on
the output of the result oracle. We proposed two zero-knowledge based RFID
authentication protocols which are wide-strong private. The proposed protocols
have been formally proved to be wide-strong private. Moreover, the reader can
obtain the tag’s signature after a successful tag authentication. The optimized
protocol eliminates the modular computations in the prime field.
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